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PARENTS INVOL VED IN COMMUNITYSCHOOL V SEA TTLE SCHOOL
DISTRICT NO. 1: AN ENDORSEMENT OF DE FACTO SEGREGATION?
Edward C. Combs, Jr. *
"IF WE CANNOT END OUR DIFFERENCES AT LEAST WE CAN MAKE THE WORLD
SAFE FOR DIVERSITY."
John F. Kennedy'
INTRODUCTION
For the past fifty years, our nation has embraced, both willingly and otherwise,
the constitutional mandate of dismantling government-imposed segregation of the
races within the public school system. In 1954, nine United States Supreme Court
Justices unanimously declared that the segregation of public school children based
on race was not merely unconstitutional, but that it fostered an inequity that had
long been in need of eradication.2 Brown v. Board of Education was a case in
which the Supreme Court at long last placed its overdue imprimatur on the affirma-
tion that segregation in public schools was without the bounds of the United States
Constitution. Some half of a century later in Parents Involved in Community
School v. Seattle School District, Number 1, the Court, comprised of nine new Jus-
tices, was squarely confronted with the questions that were sure to follow the
landmark ruling in Brown. If government sanctioned segregation was inherently
wrong, was government sanctioned integration inherently right? Was the goal of
Brown to achieve some aspirational plateau of racial tolerance that can only come
about from diversity in our institutions of learning? If the Equal Protection Clause
proscribed de jure segregation, was the same true for de facto segregation? Is ra-
cial diversity within the public school system enough of a compelling state interest
to warrant the use of race in determining what school a student may attend? This
comment attempts to analyze how the Court came to answer the aforementioned
questions in the negative, tracing both the legal history and political rhetoric that
culminated in one of the most important cases that the Court decided on its 2007
docket.
Edward Combs, Jr. is a third year law student at Barry University, Dwayne 0. Andreas School of Law
where he served as Executive Editor of the Barry Law Review from Fall of 2008 to Spring of 2009. 1 would like
to give special thanks to my wife, Alicia, daughter, Isabelle, and sons, Edward and Jackson. Your support has
proven to be the most invaluable asset I will ever have.
1. John F. Kennedy, American University Commencement Address, 10 June 1963, available at
http://www.americanrhetoric.com/speeches/j fkamericanuniversityaddress.html.
2. Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
3. Id.
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I. SEPARATE BUT EQUAL
From the historic declaration that these united states would from thereafter be
independent from the British crown, our nation has condoned, both through law
and custom, the inequitable separation of the races in nearly every aspect of Amer-
ican life. Yet, not until the Supreme Court's 1894 ruling in Plessy v. Ferguson4 did
the Court finally harmonize the Constitution with the deeply entrenched custom of
segregation. In Plessy, the Court held that the doctrine of separate but equal was
constitutionally sound in that it did not deprive the African American of equal pro-
tection of the law.5 The Court effectively placed the constitutional stamp of ap-
proval on a doctrine that would in fact constrain any effort to achieve parity be-
tween the races.6 Plessy involved a challenge to a Louisiana law that prohibited the
intermixing of the races in railway carriages.7 Grounded in the Fourteenth
Amendment 8 of the U.S. Constitution, the petitioners argued that as African Amer-
icans who were barred from the "White Only" section of the train car, they were in
fact being deprived equal protection under the law.9 The Court in Plessy thought
otherwise. The Court said that segregation itself did not deprive blacks equal pro-
tection, as the Louisiana law stated that no person would be permitted to occupy a
seat other than the one assigned. 10 In essence, white patrons were not free to use
the "Colored" sections of the train either. In one of the most revered dissents in
American jurisprudence, Justice Harlan decried the Court's reasoning and articu-
lated the obvious, "[e]very one knows that the statute in question had its origin in
the purpose, not so much to exclude white persons from railroad cars occupied by
blacks, as to exclude colored people from coaches occupied by or assigned to white
persons."'" Thus, in what many today consider a perverse construction of the Four-
teenth Amendment, the Court was able to reconcile the promise of equality with
the reality of segregation.
II. BROWN V. BoARD OF EDUCATION
In the years following Plessy, legislatures, both federal and state, slowly
moved toward more egalitarian notions of equality.12 In 1954, the U.S. Supreme
Court at last dealt a blow to one of the oldest and most guarded bastions of inequity
still within our nation's boundaries. Brown v. Board of Education said that, at least
4. Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896).
5. Id. at 543.
6. Id.
7. Id. at 540.
8. U.S. CONST., amend. XIV, § 1. ("No State shall.. .deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal
protection of the laws").
9. Plessy, 163 U.S. at 542.
10. Id. at 537.
11. Id. at 557 (Harlan, J. dissenting).
12. See, e.g., Sweat v. Painter, 339 U.S. 629 (1950); McLaurin v. Okla. State Regents, 339 U.S. 637
(1950).
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in public elementary schools, "[s]eparate education facilities are inherently un-
equal.'
13
In Brown, the Supreme Court, through Chief Justice Earl Warren, overruled the
long-lived canon codified in Plessy. 14 A compilation of five separate cases, Brown
challenged the laws in Kansas, South Carolina, Virginia, and Delaware that, like
seventeen other states and the District of Columbia, operated under a segregated
school system.15 In Brown, the Court flatly rejected the "separate but equal" doc-
trine once and for all in the American public elementary and high school settings.
The Court confronted the narrower argument with regard to segregation in schools.
The Court considered whether "segregation of children in public schools solely on
the basis of race... deprive[s] the children of the minority group of equal education-
al opportunities?"' 16 Reading the Fourteenth Amendment not as some "color-blind"
manifestation granting equality to all, but rather as a tool specifically designed by
its framers to relieve the most vulnerable in our society, the Court serendipitously
reached that conclusion which had eluded it for so long. In Plessy, the Court rea-
soned that the Equal Protection Clause is not offended by segregation as it applied
equally to whites and blacks alike. 17 That rationale would find no sanctuary in the
Brown decision. As was obvious to all persons of even the most remedial compe-
tence, "[s]egregation of white and colored children in public schools has a detri-
mental effect upon the colored children .... Any language in Plessy v. Ferguson
contrary to this finding is rejected."' 18
III. BROWNIN ACTION
Segregation was deeply entrenched in our nation's laws and customs. If it can
be said that Brown finally killed the laws, the customs were slower to die. Follow-
ing the decision in Brown, that segregation was unconstitutional, the Court had to
decide how it would implement the mandate. The Supreme Court found itself in
the unprecedented situation of having to force municipalities and school boards to
comply with the directive. The Court opted to issue a proclamation that schools
that once were segregated should take steps to integrate "with all deliberate
speed."' 19 This amorphous command left it to the imaginations of the local gov-
ernments, many of whom the decision was aimed at, to construe its meaning. With
the ambiguous language used by the Court, the segregated school districts were
given time to develop methods of undermining the mandate.°20 In Virginia, for ex-
ample, Prince Edward County simply closed all of the public schools in what was
13. Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483,495 (1954).
14. Id.
15. RICHARD KLUGER, SIMPLE JUSTICE: THE HISTORY OF BROWN V. BOARD OF EDUCATION AND BLACK
AMERICA'S STRUGGLE FOR EQUALITY 257 (Vintage 1977).
16. Brown, 347 U.S. at 493 (emphasis added).
17. Plessy, 163 U.S. at 554.
18. Brown, 347 U.S. at 497.
19. Brown et. al. v. Bd. ofEduc. et al, 349 U.S. 294, 301 (1955).
20. Id.
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known as the Massive Resistance to the U.S. Supreme Court's ruling in Brown.2'
For five years, the Board of Supervisors for Prince Edward County refused to ap-
propriate any funding for public education.22 Not until 1964 did the state of Vir-
ginia finally submit to the contention that white and black students were going to
attend school together.23
IV. DE JURE SEGREGATION AND EQUAL PROTECTION
It has been argued that at the heart of Brown was the demise of dejure segre-
gation 24; which is segregation specifically imposed by law. This interpretation
allowed for a construal of Brown that did not call for integration, but rather dese-
gregation. Thus, how to effectuate Brown became a point of contention for both
sides.
As the country pushed forward in the years following the Brown decision, dif-
ferences in its implementation arose simultaneously. For example, in North Caro-
lina, affirmative efforts were underway to bring integration about by means of bus-
ing black students to all white schools, even though the black students were not
within the geographical boundaries set out by the local board to warrant attendance
of the school.25 In response to this, the North Carolina General Assembly passed
an Anti-Bussing law that stated, in pertinent part, that:
"No student shall be assigned or compelled to attend any school on
account of race, creed, color or national origin, or for the purpose
of creating a balance or ratio of race, religion or national origins.
Involuntary bussing of students in contravention of this article is
prohibited, and public funds shall not be used for any such buss-ing.,,26
Basing its rationale on the ruling in Brown, that race-consciousness was un-
constitutional when applied to the public school system, the North Carolina legisla-
ture negated any effort to remedy past discrimination by way of bussing pro-
grams.27 In North Carolina State School Board v. Swann, the Supreme Court af-
firmed a lower court's ruling that parts of the law enacted by the North Carolina
legislature were obstructive to the constitutional guarantees mentioned in Brown.28
North Carolina's attempt to circumvent desegregation efforts by announcing that
student assignments should be "color blind" in light of the Brown decision was
disingenuous to say the least. At this point, there were no laws on the North Caro-
21. Griffin v. County Sch. Bd., 377 U.S. 218, 221 (1964).
22. Id.
23. Id.
24. Dejure segregation is that type of segregation that is permitted by law. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY
(8th ed. 2004).
25. N.C. State Bd. ofEduc. v. Swan, 402 U.S. 43 (1971).
26. Id. at 44.
27. Id.
28. Id.
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lina books that required segregation of the races in public schools. 29 Yet, the so-
cioeconomic lines that had been drawn by years of forced segregation and racial
discrimination would prove to secure the result that many segregationists desired.
Rejecting the argument of the state, the U.S. Supreme Court awarded wide latitude
to the local school board that instituted the bussing program. 30 The Court said of
local school boards that:
"[s]chool authorities have wide discretion in formulating school
policy, and that as a matter of educational policy school authorities
may well conclude that some kind of racial balance in the schools
is desirable quite apart from any constitutional requirements.
However, if a state-imposed limitation on a school authority's dis-
cretion operates to inhibit or obstruct the operation of a unitary
school system or impede the disestablishing of a dual school sys-
tem, it must fall.'
' 1
In N. C. State Bd. of Educ. v. Swann, the Court gave local governments the abil-
ity to ensure racial balance, arguably the main goal of Brown, in districts through-
out the country where dejure segregation was in effect.32 The Court realized that
in order for past discrimination and segregation to fully be remedied, race could not
simply be ignored. In fact, to ensure racial parity in the public school system,
measures would have to be taken in which race would be specifically considered.
What the Court did not specifically address in Swann, the central issue that was
in question in Parents Involved in Community Schools, was the issue of affirmative
efforts to ensure racial balance in systems in which dejure segregation did not pre-
viously exist. Efforts to abate or proactively avoid defacto segregation that occurs
without the force of law have been largely thwarted in recent years.33 Under the
blanket of the Fourteenth Amendment, opponents of such race-balancing programs
argue that the Equal Protection Clause strictly prohibits the cognizant use of race
by the government in any and all circumstances.34 Clearly, the Court has held that
when remedying past de jure discrimination, governments can use race as a factor
in those efforts. 35 Yet, there has been less judicial support for attempts to affirma-
tively spread balance in areas that have not traditionally been affected by de jure
segregation.
The Court has held that "when defacto discrimination is at issue our tradition
has been that the remedial rules are different. ' ' 36 Without a compelling state inter-
est, such as past de jure discrimination, the state government cannot use race as a
29. Swarm v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1, 16 (1971).
30. Id. at 45.
31. N.C. State Bd. of Educ. v. Swarm, 402 U.S. 43 (1971).
32. Id. at 46.
33. See, e.g., Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 127 S. Ct. 2738 (2007).
34. Id.
35. Id. at 2796 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).
36 Id
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determining factor in student assignments.3 7 The Court has held that "remedying
past societal discrimination does not justify race-conscious government action.""
Therefore, even to alleviate the manifestation of segregated schools that come
about by housing patterns or other socioeconomic phenomena, a state cannot use
race as a factor in achieving its goal.39 In Parents Involved, the Chief Justice stated
that the Equal Protection Clause required that race not be used by the Seattle
School District.4 0 The dissent disagreed with the constitutional interpretation of the
Fourteenth Amendment given by the Court. 4' Laws that are created to include ra-
ther than exclude members of a particular race, in the dissent's view, deserve a
different level of analysis. 42 It has been argued that the Fourteenth Amendment
was created by its framers for the specific purpose of securing equality for those
who were emancipated from slavery.43 At no point could it have been thought that
a "color-blind" society was to emerge based upon the verbiage of the amendment.
44
Arguing for the Seattle School District's voluntary integration program, a number
of Reconstruction-era historians and scholars stated that "[t]he Seattle and Louis-
ville integration policies are fully consistent with both the goals of the Reconstruc-
tion project and the means Congress deemed permissible to effectuate those
goals.
4 5
V. AFFIRMATIVE ACTION
With the advent of Affirmative Action46 programs across the country, oppo-
nents have, as in the Swann cases, used the Fourteenth Amendment to deny the
ability of school systems to achieve a racial balance within the academic environ-
ment.47 In Regents of the University of California v. Bakke,48 the U.S. Supreme
Court forced the University of California at Davis School of Medicine (hereinafter,
"UC Davis") to admit a white student that had previously been rejected. UC Davis
had an Affirmative Action program that used race as a determining factor when
selecting participants for admission to medical school. Allan Bakke was denied
admission even though his test scores and other academic credentials were higher
37. Id. at 2763.
38. Id. at 2758.
39. Id. at 2775 (Thomas, J., concurring).
40. Id. at 2751.
41. Id. at 2815 (Stevens, J. dissenting).
42. Id.
43. JEFFERY ROSEN, THE SUPREME COURT. THE PERSONALITIES AND RIVALRIES THAT DEFINED AMERICA
125 (Times Books 2006).
44. Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 559 (1896).
45. Brief for Historians as Amici Curiae Supporting Respondents, Parents Involved in Cmty. Schs. v.
Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 2005 U.S. Briefs 908, 910.
46. JETHRO LIEBERMAN, THE EVOLVING CONSTITUTION 42 (Random House 1977) ("Affirmative Action is
the name given to a controversial set of policies that at bottom rests on the proposition that government may con-
stitutionally take race or some other suspect classification into account as long as in so doing it intends to benefit
one group rather than harm another.")
47. See, e.g., Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978).
48. Id.
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than some of the black students that were admitted. 49 The school reasoned that the
program was needed to "(i) reduc[e] the historic deficit of traditionally disfavored
minorities in medical schools and in the medical profession,...; (ii) countering the
effects of societal discrimination; (iii) increasing the number of physicians who
will practice in communities currently underserved; and (iv) obtaining the educa-
tional benefits that flow from an ethnically diverse student body., 50 The Court in
Bakke was 4-4 on whether race could be considered under the Equal Protection
Clause absent proof of past de jure segregation or discrimination based on race,
with the ninth deciding vote declining to weigh in on this specific issue.5'
In Grutter v. Bollinger,52 the Court upheld the University of Michigan Law
School's program that considered race as one of many factors amongst its appli-
cants. The Court held that the program was narrowly tailored enough and achieved
a compelling interest in diversity, while not offending the Fourteenth Amend-
ment.53 This holding is noteworthy for a number of reasons, namely that unlike the
Parents Involved case, Grutter upheld the racial classification of students in a merit
based system. 54 That is to say that race could actually displace some other evalua-
tive criterion in the selection process, such as grade point average, entrance test
scores, and the like.55 In Parents Involved, there was no such merit based system
in place in which race supplanted some other meritorious criteria.
56
VI. STRICT SCRUTINY
In order for a race-conscious program such as the one implemented in Seattle
to be deemed constitutional, it must survive the test of strict scrutiny. 57 In order to
pass this level of judicial review, "the school [district] must demonstrate that their
use of such classifications is 'narrowly tailored' to achieve a 'compelling' govern-
ment interest., 58 In Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, the Supreme Court articu-
lated the rule that in all equal protection claims of suspect classifications, whether
rooted in either the Fifth or Fourteenth Amendment, the state action against which
the claims are brought are to be subjected to this higher level of evaluation.59 As
stated, in order to be deemed constitutional, a government program that utilizes
race as a criterion for the reception of services must show that the program serves a
compelling state interest. 6° In education, the desire to foster a diverse student pop-
ulation has not necessarily been deemed a compelling state interest to the point that
49. Id. at 269.
50. Id. at 306.
51. Id. at 339.
52. Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 382 (2003).
53. Id. at 310.
54. Id.
55. Id. at 371 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment).
56. Parents Involved, 127 S. Ct. at 2818 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
57. Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200 (1995).
58. Parents Involved, 127 S. Ct. at 2738.
59. Adarand, 515 U.S. at 200.
60. Id. at 224-25.
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a school board can use the race of a student in its admissions program. 6' This in-
deed was the central point of the Parents Involved argument. The plaintiff argued
that absent past de jure segregation, there was no compelling state interest to pro-
vide a racially inclusive student body.62
The converse argument to that is simply that the state does have an interest in
both creating and maintaining a student body that comports with basic notions of
racial equity. The test, according to the majority in Parents Involved, is unwaver-
ing and makes no distinction between those programs that are intended to include
and those intended to exclude. 63 In previous cases dealing with racial classifica-
tions, the U.S. Supreme Court has said that "a government interest in student body
diversity 'in the context of higher education' is 'compelling. ''64 This reasoning
would lead one to the conclusion, as it did the lower district court and the Ninth
Circuit in the Parents Involved case, that the Seattle program indeed served a com-
pelling interest. 65 In Grutter v. Bollinger, the U.S. Supreme Court dealt with a set
of facts similar to those in Parents Involved. In Grutter, a student was denied ad-
mission to the University of Michigan School of Law and subsequently brought
suit alleging that minority students were given higher preference for admission
even though her academic credentials surpassed those of some of the minority ad-
mittees. 66 Defending the University's diversity program, the Court acknowledged
"that diversity is essential to its educational mission.' 6
7
The compelling interest in Grutter, a diverse student body, seems more than
analogous to the interest articulated by the Seattle School District. Yet, the strict
scrutiny test is applied in two different ways by the Court. The only compelling
interest that would provide sanctuary for the integration program in Seattle is that
of remedying some past de jure segregation. 68 The Court in Parents Involved re-
conciles this discrepancy by distinguishing between the totality of the diversity
programs.69 In Grutter, the Court maintains that the University of Michigan used
race as one of many criteria to achieve its objective of a diverse student body, not
merely race alone.
There is also an argument to be made that the test for strict scrutiny is not the
same for all racial classification cases. The dissent in Parents Involved points out
that "no case ... has ever held that the test of "strict scrutiny" means that all racial
classifications, no matter whether they seek to include or exclude, must in practice
be treated the same., 7' The observation of race-based programs is not a static one.
As the Court said in Grutter, and restated in the dissent of Parents Involved,
61. Parents Involved, 127 S. Ct. at 2757.
62. Id. at 2738.
63. Id.
64. Id.
65. Id. at 2746.
66. Grutter, 539 U.S. at 317.
67. Id. at 327.
68. Parents Involved, 127 S. Ct. at 2783.
69. Id.
70. Grutter, 539 U.S. at 330.
71. Parents Involved, 127 S. Ct. at 2816 (Breyer, J. dissenting).
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"[c]ontext matters when reviewing race-based governmental action under the Equal
Protection Clause.,
72
VII. THE PARENTS INVOLVED DECISION
The Seattle School District No. 1, which had not operated a dejure segregated
school system in its past, had in place a program that allowed incoming high school
students to choose from within the district which school they would attend from a
selection of schools of which they were eligible to attend. From 1999 to 2001,
the school district had in place an affirmative integration program that attempted to
maintain a racial balance within the high schools of the school district.74 When a
school becomes oversubscribed, the district relies on a number of factors to act as
"tie-breakers" to determine which school the student will attend.75 For instance, if
the student has a sibling that already is in attendance at the oversubscribed high
school that the student has chosen, he or she will be given initial preference. Ab-
sent a sibling already in attendance, another such tie-breaker, and the one which
commenced this litigation, was the use of the race of the student as a determinant
for which school the student will be assigned.76 The school district's white/non-
white make-up was forty-one percent to fifty-nine percent, respectively.77 "If an
oversubscribed school is not within 10 percentage points of the district's overall
white/nonwhite racial balance, it is what the district calls 'integration positive', and
the district employs a tie-breaker that selects for assignment students whose race
'will serve to bring the school into balance."' ' 78 Voluntarily, the school district
distributed the students accordingly to achieve a racial balance that was indicative
of a fully unitary school environment by reflecting "the racial composition of the
school district as a whole., 79 Yet, as stated previously, since the school district had
not mandated de jure segregation of the races in the past, it was argued that the
school district "neither is constitutionally compelled [n]or permitted to undertake
race-based remediation. 80 Even for a school that has operated de jure segregated
schools in the past, once it is found to be unitary, or fully integrated to the extent of
the law, even voluntary use of race in school assignments is unconstitutional in the
K-12 public school setting.
8
'
The paradox that is created seems obvious. On the one hand, when school dis-
tricts have operated dejure segregated schools, affirmative integration is not only
constitutional, it can be (and often times is) judicially mandated.82 On the other,
72. Id. at 2817 (quoting Grutter, 539 U.S. at 326-27).
73. Id. at 2746.
74. Id.
75. Id.
76. Id.
77. Parents Involved, 127 S. Ct. at_2747.
78. Id.
79. Id.
80. Id. at 2768 (Thomas, J. concurring).
81. Id.
82. Id. at 2752.
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voluntary affirmative integration programs are unconstitutional in school districts
that have not operated under the auspices of segregation or are unitary.83 The
Court seems to come to the widely held view that integration is a positive goal and
that school districts that were, in their past, in contrast to this basic tenet of equali-
ty, can be ordered to use race as a means of achieving that goal.
In the 2000-2001 school years, five of the ten Seattle School District No. 1
high schools were oversubscribed. 4 Three of these high schools were "integration
positive" schools in that the racial make-up of the schools was greater than fifty-
one percent white.85 This resulted in minority students being more preferred for
enrollment than white students and, in fact, white students were denied enrollment
based solely on their race.86 Yet, the program was not designed to transfer only
minority students to schools with higher student populations.87 If a school had
more than the proportional amount of minority students and was oversubscribed,
white students were then given preference over minority students for assignment. 88
The parents of students who were denied admission to the oversubscribed school of
their choice because the school was not what the district considered "in racial bal-
ance," formed Parents Involved in Community Schools (hereinafter, "Parents In-
volved")89 in order to challenge the integration policy on Equal Protection grounds,
Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, and the Washington Civil Rights Act.90
In the lower district court, the court ruled in favor of the Seattle School Dis-
trict's motion for summary judgment, finding that the integration program was
narrowly tailored and did in fact advance a compelling state interest, thus, surviv-
ing the strict scrutiny required by Adarand.91 The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals
initially reversed the district court ruling, only to withdraw that opinion and re-
move its injunction against the school district while it certified the question on the
state law to the Washington State Supreme Court.92 The Washington Supreme
Court found that the state law was not violated by the school district's integration
program because the law was meant to prohibit government programs that gave
preferential treatment to lesser qualified candidates over more qualified ones based
solely on their race.93 The Ninth Circuit then reversed the district court ruling on
federal constitutional grounds, only to have an en banc Ninth Circuit decision over-
rule the panel, thus holding that the integration program was constitutional. 94
Parents Involved argued that it had "an interest in not being 'forced to compete
for seats at certain high schools in a system that uses race as a deciding factor in
83. Id. at 2738.
84. Parents Involved, 127 S. Ct. at 2746.
85. Id.
86. Id.
87. Id.
88. Id.
89. It has not been ascertained by the author of this article if the racial make-up of Parents Involved in
Community Schools is all-white or a mix of white and non-white parents.
90. Parents Involved, 127 S. Ct. at 2748.
91. Id. at 2751.
92. Id. at 2759.
93. Id. at 2748.
94. Id. at 2759.
10
Barry Law Review, Vol. 12, Iss. 1 [2009], Art. 7
https://lawpublications.barry.edu/barrylrev/vol12/iss1/7
Parents Involved
many of its admissions decisions."' 95 What is meant by "compete" seems ambi-
guous. All parties seem to stipulate that the criterion for admission at the oversub-
scribed schools is not based on some evaluated performance or act.96 In fact, it
would appear as though there is a complete lack of competitive opportunity for
assignment as students are assigned by their race. And it is the use of race, in order
to promote a more diverse and integrated learning environment, which the school
district argues is a compelling state interest. 97
The U.S. Supreme Court, through the Chief Justice, articulated the burden for
strict scrutiny that the school district must overcome in order to vindicate its race-
based program.98 In order to survive strict scrutiny, "the school [district] must
demonstrate that the use of individual racial classifications in the assignment plans
here under review is 'narrowly tailored' to achieve a 'compelling' government
interest." 99 The Court has said that in the context of public education, there are two
interests that validly qualify as compelling. Remedying the effects of past de jure
segregation has been deemed a compelling interest, yet without a showing of past
segregation, "the Constitution is not violated by racial imbalance in the schools."'0°°
The Seattle School District had not in its past, nor did it argue that it had, operated
segregated schools for white students and minority students. 101
What the School District did argue is that the Supreme Court's ruling in Grut-
ter held that diversity "in the context of higher education" was a compelling state
interest that would withstand the strict scrutiny of the Court.'0 2 The Court coun-
tered with the observation that in Grutter, "[t]he diversity interest was not focused
on race alone but encompassed 'all factors that may contribute to student body
diversity.'""03 The differences between Grutter and the case at bar are plain to see.
In Grutter, the student was denied admission to law school, 104 a highly competitive
environment where admission to any institution is anything but guaranteed. In
Parents Involved, the students were guaranteed admission into a Seattle School
District high school, with the only variable being which district high school they
would attend.0 5 The consequences in Grutter were that a student may not be able
to attend law school at all, as opposed to the law school of their choice. Further,
there are greater academic and admission requirement discrepancies amongst our
nation's law schools than within the Seattle School District.106 In Grutter, the indi-
vidual was denied admission to the University of Michigan School of Law, 10 7 a
95. Id. at 275 1.
96. Id. at 2746.
97. Parents Involved, 127 S. Ct. at 2738.
98. Id, at 2748.
99. Id. at 2742.
100. Id. at 2752 (quoting Milliken v. Bradley, 433 U.S. 267, 280 (1977)).
101. Id. at 2747 (stating that "Seattle has never operated segregated schools").
102. Id. at 2753.
103. Id.
104. Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306 (2003).
105. Parents Involved, 127 S. Ct. at 2748.
106. In order to attain acceptance to law school, applicants must complete, with a competent score, the
LSAT. See generally http://www.lsac.org/LSAT/about-the-lsat.asp.
107. Grutter, 539 U.S. at 312.
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highly regarded legal institution. It would be of little consolation to be admitted to
a school of lesser reputation and prestige. Yet the Court in Grutter upheld the Uni-
versity of Michigan's diversity program as furthering a compelling interest. 108 The
Grutter case consisted of a highly selective school that was determining whether or
not a student would be granted admission. Conversely, the Seattle School District
granted all students within their geographic boundaries admission to high school
without competition, with the only limitation being on the location of the school. 109
The Court speaks of the "highly individualized, holistic review" that was used
in the Grutter case with regard to its diversity program. 110 Yet the pivotal differ-
ence between the two cases seems to be exactly what was being denied: admission
as opposed to location. The Court argues that unlike Grutter, this case does not
take race as a single element among a broader array of factors, and in the current
case, "when race comes into play, it is decisive by itself." '' However, this ratio-
nale ignores the fact that in a Grutter-like situation, as with any program that uses
race as a dynamic, all other factors being equal, race would patently be decisive by
itself.
The majority argues that there is a bright line between dejure segregation and
racial imbalance due to defacto segregation--the latter being beyond the remedy of
the constitution; and the former being the exception to the general rule that racial
classification in the public school setting are unconstitutional. 112 Yet, if one reads
the opinion of Brown v. Board of Education to mean what it expressly says, that
segregated schools are inherently unequal, then the means represent very little.
Schools that are segregated by law, by custom, or by some other socioeconomic
means all result in segregated schools, only one group of which requires constitu-
tional remediation. Justice Thomas, in concurring with the majority decision,
writes boldly that "racial imbalance is not segregation." ' 1 3 Yet, in the same breath
he concludes that racial balance is simply integration. 114 This semantic contradic-
tion is precisely what the dissent argues is being used to support the notion that the
Fourteenth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution demands the dissolution of a pro-
gram designed to include members of the underrepresented class in the academic
setting. 115 Justice Thomas' concurrence indeed makes no distinctions between de
facto and de jure segregation. 116 Announcing only that segregation is the state
mandated operation of a dual educational system, he concludes that racial imbal-
ance, presumably no matter how skewed, is not deserving of the protections of the
law. 117 Without a prior "history of state-enforced racial separation, a school district
has no affirmative legal obligation to take race-based remedial measures to elimi-
108. Id. at 306.
109. Parents Involved, 127 S. Ct. at 2748.
110. Id. at 2763.
111. Id. at 2753.
112. Id. at 2761.
113. Id. at 2768 (Thomas, J., concurring).
114. Id.
115. Id. at 2797 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
116. Parents Involved, 127 S. Ct. at 2769 (Thomas, J., concurring).
117. Id.
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nate segregation and its vestiges.' 1 8 Surely, the majority holds that not only is
there no legal obligation, but there is no legal right. "19
The dissent argues that "the racial classifications at issue here should be
viewed differently than others, because they do not impose burdens on one race
alone and do not stigmatize or exclude.' 20 At the very heart of Brown was the
implication that blacks were inferior to white students, both in the school facilities
in which they studied and in their ability to learn within the walls of those facili-
ties.121 Prior to Brown, racial classifications were used to subordinate a class of
society. 22 The dissent contends that the prohibition against racial classifications in
the school setting was intended at its very core to stop efforts aimed at exclusion
rather than inclusion. 23 The irony in invalidating a program aimed at granting
equal opportunity to the races by way of the Equal Protection Clause does not go
unnoticed by the dissent. Justice Stevens decried the majority opinion in stating
that:
"Rejecting arguments [in School Comm. of Boston v. Board of
Education124] comparable to those that the plurality accepts today,
that court noted: 'It would be the height of irony if the racial im-
balance act, enacted as it was with the laudable purpose of achiev-
ing equal educational opportunities, should, by prescribing school
pupil allocations based on race, founder on unsuspected shoals in
the Fourteenth Amendment.""
25
The dissent argues that since the inception of mandated integration, there has
been a line between the use of a racial criterion to exclude rather than include. 1
26
Those programs that are intended to act as inclusive should, according to the dis-
sent, be treated differently than those designed to exclude with regard to judicial
review in order to keep with the spirit of Brown. 1
27
VIII. IN THE WAKE OF PARENTSINVOL VED
Both sides of the argument draw dismal conclusions with respect to the imple-
mentation of the opposition's theory. The majority argues that if we are to adhere
to the proposition that school boards or the like are free to use racial criteria in de-
termining such things as school assignments, the prospect for misuse cannot be
118. Id. at 2771.
119. Id.
120. Id. at 2798 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
121. Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
122. See, e.g., Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896).
123. Id.
124. Sch. Comm. of Boston v. Bd. of Educ., 227 N.E.2d 729 (Mass. 1967).
125. Parents Involved, 127 S. Ct. at 2798 (quoting Sch. Comm. of Boston v. Bd. of Educ., N.E.2d 729, 733
(Mass. 1967)).
126. Id. at 2815 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
127. Id.
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ignored. 128 How far into the classroom could administrations, under the guise of
integration, utilize race to manipulate such things as behavior and association? If
the school board could dictate the racial balance for the school itself, could they
affirmatively construct the racial balance of individual classes? Suppose the school
felt that in the interests of diversity, the implementation of a plan whereby each
high school locker alternated between minority and non-minority students. Could
the school prescribe the racial make-up of the football team? How about the lun-
chroom tables? Does the school have a compelling interest in seeing that they too
are diverse? These are the possible scenarios that the majority conceivably holds
could indeed come to fruition if the Seattle program, and similar ones, are allowed
to stand.
On the other side, if we contend that the law will not permit the use of race as a
criterion in school assignment, save for past de jure discrimination, how can the
law protect us from defacto segregation? Chief Justice Roberts boldly writes that
"[t]he way to stop discrimination on the basis of race is to stop discriminating on
the basis of race."' 129 This supposition may seem rather utopian if not disingenuous
on its face. Surely, the Chief Justice was writing about discrimination imposed by
the state. But what is left over is that deeply rooted custom that has lingered well
past the Brown decision. The socioeconomic lines that have created well-defined
divides amongst the races do in fact exist today. Neither side disputes that. Yet
what the majority holds and the dissent fears is that an ever growing population
subjugated to defacto segregation will have no substantive remedy at law. 130 And
if the premise that segregation is inherently unequal, whether de facto or de jure,
then, if we hold true to the words in Brown, we are creating an inherently unequal
body of academia.
The future reality lies with the ruling, until changed. Yet, the majority argu-
ment, that an unchecked use of race-conscious assignments in schools could lead to
abuse by those who's intentions might not "remain as good as Justice Breyer's', 31,
presupposes that the race-conscious school assignments will at some point in time
go unchecked. Nothing in the dissenting opinion seems to argue that school boards
or local governments should be given unbridled power to use race-conscious means
to achieve any objective. In contrast, the dissent contends that a level of judicial
oversight is needed even in the most innocent of cases. 1
32
CONCLUSION
A school system's voluntary endeavor to achieve parity, to champion diversity,
and to affirmatively seek not to slip into the dark recesses of our imbued national
past is something that warrants admiration instead of rebuke. There is something
quite disingenuous in the argument that the very law that was used to strike down
128. Id.
129. Id. at 2768.
130. Id. at 2769 (Thomas, J., concurring).
131. Id. at 2788 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment).
132. Id. at 2828 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
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the not-so-archaic shackles of segregation can be utilized to see that the purpose of
that battle is never achieved.
The majority seems to come to the conclusion that the Seattle School District's
integration program denies students, both black and white, of equal protection
guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment in so much that they can be denied ad-
mission to the school of their choice solely due to their race. Yet if the district had
operated a dejure segregated school in the past, the same denial resulting from the
same integration program would be, at least to the majority, more palatable. 133 The
dissent in Parents Involved accused the majority of rewriting history in its interpre-
tation of Brown and other civil rights cases that have come before the Court. 34
Indeed, the majority, in Justice Thomas' concurrence, goes so far as to compare the
dissent's plea for upholding the Seattle School District's integration plan to the
arguments made by the segregationalists in Plessy. 135 The Fourteenth Amendment
was created to protect the equal rights of the least of our citizens. 36 As Justice
Harlan so aptly wrote in his dissent in the Civil Rights cases, "[a]t every step in this
direction the nation has been confronted with class tyranny. ,,137
133. Id. at 2769 (Thomas, J., concurring).
134. Id. at 2798 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
135. Id. at 2783 (Thomas, J., concurring).
136. Id.
137. U.S. v. Stanley, 109 U.S. 3, 62 (1883) (Harlan, J. dissenting).
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